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Foreword
" PJL realiza tion” is presently as popular a word in Thailand as it is in many other 
countries and is a term  frequently invoked by those who dislike the way the govern­
ment sector operates —either the government is “too big” or “too inefficient” or 
both. In Thailand the term “privatization” is used (most often) to denote the very 
narrow concept of turning public enterprise over to the private sector or (less fre­
quently) as a catch-all concept to mean everything that is done in the name of im­
proved efficiency. In order to formulate implementable policy, however, the term  
privatization must be defined more specifically if it is to serve as a useful basis for 
devising government action.
The task of this policy study is to offer a conceptual framework for privatization 
which, hopefully, will yield distinct areas in which government action can be taken 
to implement this im portant bureaucratic reform program. Toward this end, the 
many meanings of privatization are reviewed before privatization objectives are 
identified. Then a conceptual framework for privatization is presented which is fol­
lowed by a suggested privatization program  for Thailand.
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Executive Summary
A n  Thailand there is a great deal of confusion about the meaning of privatization. 
It does not simply mean the selling-off of public enterprises to the private sector. In 
fact, many alternative forms of privatization can be identified, including the follow­
ing: (1) government withdrawal of services; (2) divestiture; (3) joint public-private 
ventures; (4) contracting out; (5) franchising; (6) farming out; (7) leasing; (8) 
voucher-and-grant; (9) user charges; and (10) liberalization. W hat form of 
privatization should be adopted depends on the activity to be privatized and the 
particular circumstances of individual cases.
To avoid unnecessary confusion and conflict in this im portant area of reform, 
there is an urgent need for an appropriate conceptual framework. Thus, five 
privatization strategies are examined and proposed for adoption. They are:
Strategy 1: Minimum intervention and improved competition, through liberaliza­
tion;
Strategy 2: Minimum public production, through contracting out, franchising,
farming out, leasing, and voucher-and-grant;
Strategy 3: Load shedding, through government withdrawal of services;
Strategy 4: Use of commercial principles, through user charges; and
Strategy 5: Transfer of ownership, through divestiture and joint public-private
ventures.
Examples of how to apply these various strategies are suggested below:
Strategy 1: M in im um  Intervention and Im proved Com petition
• abolishing price controls on services provided by state-owned enterprises;
• abolishing detailed control of and interference with the management of 
state-owned enterprises;
• abolishing control over type and quantity of crops to be grown and area to 
be planted.
Strategy 2: M in im um  Pu b lic Production
• contracting out street cleaning;
• contracting out the management of state-owned enterprises; and
« farming out the levying of traffic fines and the collection of parking fees.
vii
Strategy 3: Lo ad  Shedding
• cancelling the public provision of refuse collection; and
• encouraging the private provision of toll goods such as amusement parks 
and public gardens.
Strategy 4: Use of Com m ercia l Prin cip les
< imposing a service charge on street use and on lane im provem ent.
Strategy 5: T ra n sfe r of O w nership
• sale of State-owned enterprises which produce for sale goods/services that 
arc presently also m arketed or potentially marketable by private undertak­
ings.
To effectively launch a privatization program, the following specific actions are 
recommended:
For the short run:
• the very clear articulation of the privatization policy to be pursued by the 
government; and
• the establishment of some kind of national center for privatization.
For the long run:
• the codification and clarification of laws related to  private property rights; 
and
• the study of potential cases for privatization and steps to be carried out.
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Privatization: An Analysis of the Concept and 
Its Implementation in Thailand
Chapter One
The Meaning of Privatization
iP riv a tiza tio n "  ta n  mean anything from “whatever is being done in the public 
sector” to “increased efficiency” to “the sale of a public enterprise.” The term can 
also be used to represent a conservative position on the efficacy of the market sys­
tem and the desirability of a reduced government role — as well as a way to dispose 
of government assets. Indeed, privatization is taken to mean so much that its true 
meanings are sometimes obsured. The following definitions found in the literature 
give a flavor to the preceding statements.
“Privatization embraces so many diverse policies.... The wide variety of policies 
and measures included under its umbrella are portrayed as being part of a move­
ment in favor of ‘rolling back’ the state in the name of freedom  and efficiency.” 
(H eald 1985)
“Privatization is seen as more than divestiture; in fact, as any process that 
reduces the involvement of the State.” (Pendse 1985) “Privatization is the transfer 
of government assets or functions to the private sector.” (Butler 1986)
In the United Kingdom “privatization means transferring to private parties the 
ownership of a state industry that had been producing very largely for private 
buyers,” whereas in the U nited States “privatization has come to mean mainly the 
government turning more to private producers for services for which government 
remains responsible and which government continues to finance. It has become 
simply a new name for contracting.” (Kolderie 1986)
The literature about privatization as an ideology is most frequently associated 
with Am erican writers who often consider the United States government to be too 
big (although the United States does not own as many public enterprises as do 
countries in Europe and on other continents). “Privatization,” meaning the sale of 
a public enterprise, has been popularized by the United Kingdom experience and 
is fervently pushed by writers from developing countries where there arc many 
money-losing public enterprises.
In between these two meanings of privatization are a host of meanings with dif­
ferent logical bases. Privatization sometimes refers to “increased com petition” as 
well as “joint venture” or “ownership transfer.” “Price flexibility” pursued by public 
enterprise is also identified as the result of privatization. Similarly, to many writers, 
“contracting out” certain activities formerly perform ed by public agencies means 
privatization. The forms and objectives (expected benefits) of privatization are used 
in the same breath to mean privatization.
2 The Meaning of Privatization
W H A T  P R IV A T IZ A T IO N  IS
Different definitions with conflicting bases are not necessarily or inherently bad 
or good, but for policy recommendation purposes — or to derive specific approaches 
to privatization —it is im portant to clarify the definition of privatization used in this 
report. As a general concept privatization conveys an ideology in which the 
desirability to reduce the size of the public sector and its involvement in the market 
economy is expressed. It denotes the desirability to allow private individuals and 
enterprises to undertake economic activities to the greatest possible extent for 
reasons of efficiency. In specific contexts privatization can refer to any of the follow­
ing measures: government withdrawal from any specific service; divestiture; joint 
public-private venture; contracting out services; franchising; farming out; leasing; 
voucher-and-grant; user charges; and liberalization.1
G overnm ent w ithdraw al from  services
W hen the government withdraws from services it no longer provides and 
produces certain goods/scrviccs2. This withdrawal may happen when, prom pted by 
any of the following, the government redefines its tasks:
« the shortage of funds to supply services;
• political persuasion/pressure for termination;
• the absence of articulated needs for these services; and/or
• the existence of similar services in the private sector.
Indeed, if these goods/services arc still deem ed valuable, there will be voluntary 
action on the part of private citizens to provide them or private enterprise will move 
in to replace the government as the service supplier. However, in the context of 
privatization, the service in question is supplied by private producers whom cus­
tom ers must now pay, no longer receiving the service from the government free of 
charge or at a subsidized price.
Divestiture
Divestiture refers to the sale of government assets to the private sector and thus 
represents the transfer of ownership from the government to the private sector. In 
almost all countries, government assets that are for sale — cither in whole or in part — 
almost exclusively involve public or state-owned enterprises.1 Com plete divestment 
removes the government entirely from involvement in enterprise operations. And, 
when divestiture involves a profitable state-owned enterprise, it also yields con­
siderable revenue to the government. When divestiture involves public enterprises 
that are suffering losses, the government can save a substantial am ount of money by 
reducing its requirem ent to subsidize.
Many forms of divestment arc possible. The entire public enterprise may be 
sold. Even in this case it can be sold as an entity or split up into many units, each 
sold separately. O r part of the enterprise may be sold. In this case, the enterprise 
may be split up into many lines of business and only certain lines of business sold. 
O r only the pattern of share ownership is changed, and some stock is sold to private 
investors. Indeed, there are many variations.4
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Closure or liquidation of a public enterprise is usually considered a form of 
divestment, although some writers would not consider them privatization. However, 
closure certainly reduces government involvement in a particular industry and it also 
implies that government is no longer in a position to continue subsidizing the opera­
tion. With the liquidation of a public enterprise (which usually enjoys a m onopo­
listic position in the m arket), the field is open for enterprising entrepreneurs to set 
up new operations — and the chance that this will happen in the free market system 
is almost guaranteed by the underlying philosophy of privatization.
Jo in t-p u b lic-p rivate  venture
Instead of selling a public enterprise (either in whole or in part), a state-owned 
enterprise may set up subsidiaries with private companies or form new ventures with 
private companies in the same business or in an allied field. A joint-public-private 
venture, as in the case of divestiture, may be regarded as a partial measure to intro­
duce private capital to share the risk of the public enterprise. Instead of direct in­
volvement in the existing public enterprise, a new enterprise is form ed with joint 
capital. Joint-public-private venture still operates on the premise that there is a need 
for some public intervention in the undertaking, which is, of course, quite different 
from the transfer of ownership of the public enterprise.
C o n tra ctin g  out
Services may be provided by government through its bureaus and departm ents, 
or goods may be directly produced by public enterprises. These services can also be 
provided and goods produced by private firms or other nongovernment agencies 
which are then paid by the government or the public enterprise in question. The 
production contract is awarded after a competitive bidding process. This constitutes 
contracting out.
Contracting out is usually discussed in connection with the production of final 
goods/services and is a cost-saving alternate to in-house production. But contract­
ing out can also involve the production of interm ediate products — that is, goods/ser­
vices which are inputs to the production of other goods/services. Contracting out is 
thus nothing new in the provision of public services; for example, the repair and 
m aintenance service of office typewriters and elevators is almost always contracted 
out. Extending the use of contracting out to cover final goods/services provided by 
the public sector is urged by many proponents of privatization.
Although contracting out as a form of privatization is usually associated with 
the private production of certain goods/services, it can also include contracting for 
the management of an activity or an enterprise. Contracting out involves govern­
ment funding, with the contractor producing and/or supplying the goods/services in 
question. Generally contractors are private firms but they can also be other govern­
ment units, as happens when the central government contracts out certain services 
to local governments or vice versa. Contracting out reduces the cost of the service 
to the greatest extent if the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. The cost-savings 
is likely to be greater when the amount of competition within the private sector is 
most intense.
4 TheMeaningjof Privatization
F ra n ch is in g
A franchise awards monopoly privileges to  a private firm to supply a particular 
service. The price charged by the franchisee is regulated by the government agency 
which grants the franchise. A  franchise can be exclusive; that is, only one franchisee 
in a definable geographic or service area has the right to produce the service. 
Franchising can be nonexclusive: multiple franchises are awarded to several firms 
or individuals, all of whom have the right to produce the same service. The privilege 
to operate is sanctioned but the franchise is no longer a monopoly.
In the case of franchising, the government abstains from providing and produc­
ing that service. Users of the service must pay the private franchisee(s) for the 
amount purchased.
F a rm in g  out
Farming out is the form of privatization that once was the m ethod used for rais­
ing revenue in the Kingdom of Thailand. Farming out is the awarding of monopoly 
privileges to the highest bidder who promises to secure a fixed amount of money (in 
the case of tax collection) or a fixed quantity of a given service and who also bears 
the cost of its collection or production.
Unlike contracting out (in which the lowest bidder is paid for producing the ser­
vice), in farming out the winning bidder is not paid for the service. The bidder earns 
payment by collecting the most taxes or producing the maximum quantity of a ser­
vice or product. If the actual taxes collected exceed the am ount to be delivered to 
the government, the bidders earn their keep; the greater the excess the m ore they 
are paid. O f course, if the actual taxes collected fall short of the am ount the bidder 
promises the government, the bidder still has to deliver the amount prom ised and 
bears the loss (by way of incurring the collection cost and offsetting the difference).
In Thailand in earlier days, the government did not regulate the taxes collected 
from farm ers the way it does today through franchising. There were very few re­
quirem ents placed on farmers; thus, the pay earned by the farm er depended on in­
genuity, efficiency, and hard work.5
Le a s in g
Instead of making use of assets such as factories and equipm ent (either because 
the government no longer needs them for operations or a public enterprise is giving 
up an operation), the government or a public enterprise may lease its assets to the 
highest bidding private operator for a specified time or to private individuals who 
are willing to meet the term s specified in the lease.
Leasing suggests the tem porary turnover of one’s own assets to others for a given 
period with the understanding that the assets could be taken back when the situa­
tion warrants or the term  expires. This turnover relieves the asset owner of the bur­
den of caring for the asset or operating the activity for its implied cost. A t the same 
time it guarantees the asset owner some income.
Turn-key operations may be viewed as a form of variable leasing. In a turn-key 
project the firm — which has, for example, constructed an airport or an expressway— 
is perm itted to operate the undertaking for a number of years and retain all income 
generated therefrom  as a means of recouping construction outlays. Payment for leas­
ing is unspecified and dependent on the operational ability of the firm; the amount
The Meaning of Privatization J>
to be received is thus paid back to the operator who has, in effect, advanced the 
funds needed for construction. The government will then take over the operation at 
the end of a specified period. A turn-key operation is thus a form of privatization 
which reduces the governm ent’s financial burden in installing and operating the first 
phases of an undertaking.
V ouch er-an d-grant
Vouchers are coupons of specified value given by the government to qualified 
citizens to be used to purchase a specific service on the open market. H ere the ser­
vice is produced by private firms while the government continues to provide fund­
ing for the service. This measure retains or increases competition in the m arket for 
the supply of the service while it subsidizes consumers and gives them  complete 
freedom to choose a supplier. Consumers of this subsidized service will naturally try 
to buy it from the seller with the lowest price. In general, not every supplier in the 
market is involved in the voucher scheme and those not in the scheme will not ac­
cept a voucher in lieu of cash payment. Only legitimate producers are entitled to ac­
cept vouchers and turn them in to the government for cash refunds.
G rants are government subsidies given to certain private firms for the produc­
tion of a service which is deem ed desirable. The subsidy m aybe in the form of direct 
grants of money to producers or in the form of tax expenditures given to tax-exempt 
producers. Thus the government provides for the service through partial funding, 
while consumers of the service must purchase it directly from the m arket. The de­
gree of competition among producers depends on the number of producers receiv­
ing the grant, and this depends on the government’s rules for eligibility and the 
nature of the service. Indeed, both vouchers and grants relieve government from 
the direct production of certain services.
U ser charges
Normally, the government provision of a service is fully financed by taxes. 
Citizens receive the service free of charge and they may or may not pay taxes. By 
charging direct users for the service, government finances the service — fully or sub­
stantially, depending on the size of the charge — with the users’ own money and thus 
behaves much like a private producer. In this case government continues to produce 
the service, but shares the financial responsibility in varying degrees with the users 
of the service.
Depending on the type of public service it is, the price paid by users may be 
called a fee, a toll, or a charge. The structure of a user charge may vary among the 
various public services depending on other subordinate objectives. For example, the 
charge may be a flat rate applicable to all users or it may be a system of differential 
rates for different types of users. Certain groups of users may be exempted from 
paying the charge or all users may be exempted if their use does not exceed a cer­
tain quantity.
L ib era lizatio n
“Liberalization” as used in the literature about privatization has a narrower 
meaning than that found in the literature of international trade. In its narrowest 
sense, liberalization means the removal or relaxation of statutory barriers against
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the development of market competition and does not include the pursuit of liberal 
trade policy with other nations, the abolition of protective tariff rates, or the 
decontrol of foreign exchange rates in line with international market forces.
This narrow meaning of liberalization brings the concept closer to the meaning 
of “deregulation” which is frequently mentioned along with liberalization. The con­
cept of deregulation is confined to decontrolling actions undertaken in areas of 
economic activity which have presently been under close regulation, e.g., utilities, 
transportation, and communications. Deregulation suggests the relaxation of public 
control over these industries which tend to create or preserve monopolies. It also 
includes allowing the private sector to provide a service now monopolized by govern­
ment. To the extent that the market is shared by public operators and private 
entrepreneurs, the need for government provision of the service is reduced, hence 
saving government funds.
In countries w here public enterprises continue to exist, liberalization is m ore 
relevant than deregulation. In this connection, liberalization is related to the relaxa­
tion of rules and regulations governing the operation of public enterprises and the 
market in which these enterprises operate. It also refers to the injection of flexibility 
into the rules and regulations and takes into account the distinct nature of a given 
public enterprise and the different contexts in which each enterprise operates.
W hether deregulation or liberalization is related to private or public m onopo­
ly, more competition will be effected and greater choices created for the benefit of 
consumers. Decontrol of prices and increased ease in market entry will usually lead 
to lower prices, increased efficiency (by introducing better production technology), 
and an improved management system which is responsive in its service to customers.
Liberalization and deregulation do not imply the complete abolition of public 
control over private-enterprise operations. Indeed, standards relating to service 
quality and relevant aspects of environmental preservation would be established and 
strictly enforced.8 Liberalization refers only to the elimination of irrelevant regula­
tions and the removal of obstacles to free-m arket operations.
Table 1 indicates the applicability of the privatization measures just noted. 
Some of the measures may be adopted by either the central government or public 
enterprise; some may be adopted by all levels of government.
W H A T  P R IV A T IZ A T IO N  IS  N O T
The preceding discussion implies that introducing “business management style” 
to public enterprises should be excluded from a privatization program. Indeed, it 
may be true that public-enterprise use of business management techniques should 
lead to increased efficiency; but this approach to management is already expected 
of a public enterprise. R ather than relying on the public sector to provide and 
produce certain goods/services, it is the rationale behind setting up a public 
enterprise in the first place. The management of a given public enterprise may not 
have m et managem ent efficiency expectations, but its application of business 
management techniques should not be viewed as privatization.
The same line of reasoning also leads to the incorrect view that the estab­
lishment by government of economic and financial systems to  control public 
en terp rises should be viewed as part of a privatization program . A public 
enterprise’s borrowing (bond financing, not equity financing) on the capital market 
should not be viewed as privatization. Such borrowing is not materially different 
from the government’s overdrawing its bank account in everyday operations, nor is
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Table 1 Applicability of Privatization M easures in the Public Sector
M easures • Centra l
Governm ent
L o c a l
Governm ent
P u b lic
En te rp rise
1. Government 
withdrawal from 
services
2. Divestiture
3. Joint-public- 
private venture
X X
X
X
4. Contracting out X X X
5. Franchising X X X
6. Farming out X X
7. Leasing X X X
8. Voucher-and-grant X X
9. U ser charges X X
10. Liberalization X X X
it different from the enterprise directly borrowing from any financial institution. 
Borrowing does not constitute any intended transfer of ownership of the enterprise.1
Public enterprises, by their very nature, operate by selling their products or ser­
vices, although the price charged may not be in accordance with the principle of 
marginal cost pricing. Also, costs may not be recovered because the operation yields 
an economy of scale in which the average cost and the marginal cost may fall, or be­
cause the price charged is below the average cost. The price charged by any public 
enterprise may be very inflexible, either because of structural rigidity in the decision­
making process or the government’s direct control over pricing. The change in 
public-enterprise pricing practices (either toward marginal cost pricing, the cost- 
recovery principle,10 or the frequent adjustm ent of prices to take into account 
changing cost conditions —or some combination of these actions) would not con­
stitute part of a privatization program  as the term  is used in this report. The reason 
for excluding this situation is the same as noted above.11
Increasing taxes should certainly not be considered a privatization measure. 
As will be clarified later (when privatization of provision is differentiated from 
privatization of production), “private donation” as such should not be regarded as 
part of a privatization program  unless private donation refers to the production of 
the service in question by a voluntary nonprofit organization and is financed by 
private donation so secured. However, if private donation is secured for the specific 
purpose of financing an entire service which is being produced by a public agency, 
such donations may be viewed as similar to the voluntary payment of a charge — no 
m atter what the benefit received — and would be considered a form of privatization.
The term  privatization should not be as inclusive as the preceding argument 
tries to convey; however, neither should the term  be so narrowly defined that it only 
refers to the sale of public enterprises to private individuals. Such a narrow  defini-
• • • 1 ^  tion, as is frequently understood in discussions of privatization in Thailand, ex­
cludes the relevance of privatization as an im portant approach to bureaucratic 
reform.
The intention of the foregoing discussion on the forms of privatization was to 
make the concept of privatization more meaningful for policy formulation purposes, 
instead of defining privatization as any measure to reduce the size of the public sec­
tor. The approach limits the scope of measures that can be utilized and gives the 
privatization program  its distinct focus. Otherwise, everything the government does 
that reduces the size of government (in terms of the annual budget) would be con­
sidered part of a privatization program  and everything that enlarges it would not — 
although these latter m easures may lead to increased efficiency. M oreover, the 
approach used in this report helps distinguish meanings of privatization based 
directly on different objectives (of privatization) from meanings of privatization 
based on different instrum ents (of privatization). This differentiation is very im por­
tant, as a given form of privatization may not work for every objective being pursued. 
This approach also helps reduce confusion over the actual meanings of privatiza­
tion and their relevance in a m odern-day economy.
A final rem ark on the m atter of definition is in order. Privatization is viewed 
here as a means to achieve certain ends, to be discussed in the following chapter. 
From  this perspective it is more effective to devise a privatization program  to serve 
a specific set o f objectives.14
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Chapter Two
Objectives and a Conceptual 
Framework for Privatization
t jT iv c n  that privatization is accepted as a beneficial policy that should be pursued, 
the specific measure the government should adopt for a given privatization program  
depends upon the objective of privatization. A privatization program  can have 
many objectives; however, all of them cannot be achieved concurrently using one 
specific measure. Moreover, in any specific situation there can or should be a p ar­
ticular privatization objective. W hat objectives should be pursued by a privatization 
program? The experience of the Thatcher government may be cited as a basis for 
the present discussion.
Heald (1985) believes that G reat Britain’s privatization program  is directed at 
achieving five objectives:
1. improving efficiency;
2. enhancing freedom;
3. curtailing the power of public-sector unions;
4. reducing public-sector borrowing requirem ents; and
5. extension of share ownership.
Clementi (1985) believes that there are four objectives pursued by Prime M in­
ister Thatcher’s privatization program:
1. to transfer nationalized industries to private ownership:
2. to open up the activities of nationalized industries to competition;
3. to eliminate certain functions carried out by the public sector altogether or 
to subcontract them to the private sector; and
4. to charge for public-sector services.
The objectives of the U.S. privatization program  are frequently cited as in­
creased competition and improved efficiency (Butler 1986; Okun 1986; H anke 
1986).
The examples cited here illustrate that one can read into any privatization 
program several objectives which may or may not be explicitly stated. The differen­
ces may be due to emphasis, expression, or perspective. It may not have been ad ­
visable for G reat Britain, as the very first country to launch a program  of privatization
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as a political move, to be explicit about its objectives. However, for a country about 
to formulate a privatization program  with the intention of implementing it success­
fully (the case in Thailand), clear objectives, whatever they turn out to be, should be 
determ ined beforehand.
T H E  O B J E C T I V E S
Although it is not the purpose of this policy study to specify a particular set of 
objectives for privatization, it is our belief that privatization program  objectives 
should be viewed from two perspectives:
1. overall objectives of privatization; and
2. objectives for specific cases in the privatization program.
The overall objectives of a privatization program may include, for example:
.  the expansion of the private sector as an engine of growth; 15
.  the introduction of m ore competition in the economy;
« a change in the public-private sector mix;
.  improved efficiency in the public sector;
• a decrease in the rate of public expenditure expansion.
The content of the privatization program would obviously differ, depending on 
which objective or which combination of objectives is to be achieved. A privatiza­
tion program  designed to increase competition in the economy and/or the expan­
sion of the private sector as an engine of growth would not be the same as one whose 
purpose was to reduce the public-enterprise sector for, to accomplish the latter, 
privatization efforts would be exclusively directed at various public enterprises.
Objectives for specific privatization program cases should not be confused or 
mixed with the overall objective of the program. Examples of such objectives could 
include:
• achieving a wider share of or stock ownership in certain public enterprises;
.  improving the perform ance of a particular public enterprise;
• reducing the financial burden placed on the central government in provid­
ing certain services;
• eliminating political interference in a certain public enterprise;
• introducing professionalism in the management of a particular public 
enterprise;
• increasing the quality of a given public service;
• making the provision of a particular public service m ore responsive to con­
sumer demand;
• reducing the cost of producing a given service.
There may be other objectives. The list above is not intended to be exhaustive. 
The works cited previously (Heald; Butler; Okun; H anke) illustrate the possibility 
of entertaining many objectives for specific cases (as well as for the overall program ). 
Indeed, privatization of any form may not be the best means to achieve many stated 
objectives. And, it may be likely that only one particular form of privatization is an 
effective alternative to attain certain objectives. One should not so readily general­
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ize the desirability o f  privatization for every case and fo r  all situations, its current 
popularity notwithstanding. The choice of alternative means for the delivery of a ser­
vice depends crucially on the objective for service availability.
A  C O N C E P T U A L  F R A M E W O R K  F O R  P R IV A T IZ A T IO N
The importance of a theoretical basis for any policy recom m endation is not 
readily appreciated in Thailand and this lack of a conceptual framework may be said 
to account for the rather shallow discussions on privatization here. O f course, con­
fusion about a new concept, especially one that has become popular, is quite com­
mon; what has happened in Thailand is not exceptional.1 ’ Therefore, to offer 
sensible suggestions on where and how to privatize the public sector, an analytical 
framework is needed.
C e rta in  prelim inary  rem arks
Three im portant aspects of the conceptual framework proposed here should be 
briefly discussed at the outset. They are:
1. the provision versus the production of goods/services;
2. final versus interm ediate products; and
3. allocation versus distribution.
Provision versus production of goods/services. Provision of a service involves 
a decision to make the service available. This involves financing for production and 
distribution of the service to relevant consumers. In the case of public provision, 
the government need not itself produce the service; it may buy the service from other 
producers and red istribu te the service to relevant consumers or it may hire 
producers to produce the service and redistribute it to relevant consumers. If con­
sumers receive the service provided by government free of charge, the government 
will recoup the cost of provision through taxation. O f course the government can 
also charge consumers a price. However, in most cases, government provides its 
services free of direct charge for reasons to be noted later.
Production of a service involves the physical process of transforming necessary 
inputs into the service. It is, in other words, the physical aspects of provision as op­
posed to the financing aspects of the process. The producer of the service may 
produce it for sale or may produce it to order for, say, the government. Such a situa­
tion applies to private as well as public producers.
A provision decision is thus separable from a production decision. Public 
provision may or may not involve public production; on the other hand, public 
production does not necessarily imply public provision. A public bureau may 
produce a service by order of a private firm and receive payment for its service. This 
distinction should be kept in mind and is very im portant to the following discussion.
Final versus interm ediate products. In the preceding discussion, “public ser­
vice” refers to a final product which is consumed by the ultimate users of the ser­
vice. If a good/service is used as an input to the production of another good/service, 
then it constitutes what is called an interm ediate product. Naturally some goods/ser­
vices can be utilized both as final goods/services and as interm ediate products. 
Production (be it public or private) of any good/service involves many kinds of in-
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tcrm cdiatc product inputs. Public production may involve the use of privately 
produced interm ediate products and vice versa. Public production can also engage 
the use of publicly produced interm ediate products.
In relation to  what has been discussed, it should be reiterated that the public 
provision of a service may also involve the public production of that particular ser­
vice. A nd in the process of producing such a service, it is possible that public produc­
tion can make use of private interm ediate products as inputs.
A llocation  versus d istribution . Allocation involves decisions about what to 
produce and how to produce it; distribution involves decisions about the recipients 
of the product. When a service is produced with allocation in mind, the producer 
is not concerned with how the service is distributed nor whether the recipients of 
the service are rich and deserving. The concern is whether the right type of service 
is being produced for the right cost and in the right quantity. That is, there is indeed 
a dem and for the service. W hen a service is produced with distribution in mind, the 
producer is concerned with who receives the service and w hether the recipient is 
deserving. It is a question of fairness. It is also a question of welfare if certain groups 
are viewed as deserving recipients.
In general, the majority of services provided by the government are for alloca­
tive purposes. However, at a given time in a given society, governments may be 
called upon to provide a service solely for distributive purposes. O f course, a 
decision by government to provide a service always has distributive implications even 
when the sole purpose of its provision is allocative. In this respect the private ap ­
proach to service provision is no different from public provision. M oreover, public 
provision to achieve distributive purposes does not necessarily imply public produc­
tion. In other words, concern for welfare does not necessarily lead to the public 
provision of services.
C h a ra cte ristics  of service
To derive a framework in which one can reasonably determ ine what services 
are to be privatized and what are to be part of the public sector, the nature of the 
service must be analyzed. Two im portant dimensions are used to classify types of 
goods/services:
1. excludability; and
2. jointness in consumption.
Excludability refers to the degree to which the service (or the benefit to be 
derived from the service) can be excluded from consumers who are unwilling to pay 
for it. In other words, excludability refers to the ability of the owner or the provider 
of the service to exclude others from the use of the service when the term s of use are 
not agreeable to the former. Service can thus be excludable or it cannot. A service 
may be excludable, but the cost of exclusion may be so high that exclusion is not 
economically viable. In such a case the service is also treated as nonexcludable.
Jointness in consumption refers to the degree to which the service (or the benefit 
to be derived from the service) must be jointly consumed. If the use or consum p­
tion of a service by a consumer makes it impossible for others to consume the ser­
vice, the service is thus separately or individually consumed. The service in question 
is said to exhibit “rivalry in consumption.” W hen consumption of a service by one 
consum er does not concurrently preclude consumption of the same service or does 
not reduce the amount of the same service consumed by others, the service is said 
to be “jointly consumed.” Although the two cases are shown to be opposite ex­
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tremes, in reality most goods/services fall along a continuum between pure in­
dividual and pure joint consumption.
Types of service
In these two service dimensions one can distinguish four major service types.
1. private goods;
2. toll goods;
3. common-pool goods; and
4. collective goods.
Figure 1 The Service Dimensions
Dimension
Exclusion
Feasible Infeasible
Individual/ (1) Private (3) Common-
rival goods pool goods
Consumption
Jointly/ (2) Toll (4) Collective
nonrival goods goods
• Private goods are pure-individually-consumed goods for which exclusion is 
completely feasible (for example, shirts, apples, bottled soft-drinks).
• Toll goods are pure-jointly-consumed goods for which exclusion is com­
pletely feasible (for example, piped water, a movie house, an amusement 
park).
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• Common-pool goods are pure-individually-consumed goods for which ex­
clusion is completely infeasible (for example, air, fish in the river, under­
ground gas).
• Collective goods are pure-jointly-consumed goods for which exclusion is 
completely infeasible (for example, national defense, police protection, air 
pollution control).
Collective goods are often regarded as pure public goods, while tool goods and 
common-pool goods are considered impure public goods because either of them 
may be publicly provided or privately provided. In many places public and private 
provision exist side by side. For instance, fish in the river are hatched by a public 
agency to increase the quantity available for consumption by those who come to fish. 
Once fish are caught and sold in the market place, they are thus privately provided. 
O r, a canal may belong to a private citizen who hatches fish to increase the supply; 
the canal owner then permits others to catch these fish for a certain price. The fee 
payers then jointly consume the fish they catch in the canal. Again, an amusement 
park maybe built by a city government and made available to children free of charge. 
The same type of park may be provided by a private entrepreneur who charges an 
entry fee.
Th e provision of service
W hereas the provision of private goods through private concerns and the 
provision of pure public goods (collective goods) through the public domain are 
m ore or less universally accepted, it is the provision of im pure public goods (toll 
goods and common-pool goods) that is the source of public-private provision con­
troversies. Thus, private entrepreneurs are able to provide private goods by charg­
ing an appropriate cost for the service. Those consumers who are unwilling to pay 
the dem anded price are effectively excluded from its consumption. As a result, in­
centive exists for private provision and private production of private goods. In other 
words, the supply of such goods is found in the market place, and price mechanisms 
determ ine their availability and quantity.
However, there are certain aspects of private goods production that are con­
ducive to the prom otion of consumer welfare —monopoly and decreasing unit 
cost —and decreasing cost itself may lead to monopoly. Although the existence of 
a monopoly and/or the decreasing cost of private goods production may not lead to 
public provision, it usually involves public intervention in the form of regulation or 
subsidy. Externality is another aspect of private goods which leads to public inter­
vention in their provision. The existence of externality can either be positive or nega­
tive; it can either occur in the production or in the consumption phase. That is, the 
production of certain private goods affects the cost or utility of other producers or 
consumers of other goods. O r the consumption of certain private goods affects the 
utility or cost of other consumers or producers of other goods.
The situation differs in the case of public goods. Private entrepreneurs are un­
able to exclude those who are unwilling to pay for the service; they becom e free­
riders. If all realize that they can consume the service without paying for it and the 
provider cannot exclude them  from consuming it, their incentive is not to pay at all. 
Thus, no private entrepreneur will undertake its provision. M oreover, because of 
the nature of a collective good, it is generally very difficult to specify its quantitative 
production, both with respect to the good itself and to the am ount consumed in­
dividually. For example, how much national defense is to be provided? How much 
police protection? How much pollution control (clean air, quiet surroundings)?
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Because the service benefits everyone, collective action is required to  provide 
such service. If collective action involves numerous persons and privately organized 
collective action cannot be mobilized, the only alternative left to provide such a ser­
vice is government. A nd special methods (i.e., taxation) must be devised to secure 
payment for its production. It should also be noted that the production of collec­
tive goods involves interm ediate products as inputs. W hen these interm ediate 
products are private goods, they can and should be privately produced. Thus, 
production of collective goods does not imply public production of all inputs as­
sociated with collective goods.
In addition to the examples of pure-public goods cited earlier, certain aspects 
of private goods can be treated  as public goods. The safety aspect of certain private 
goods (e.g., food, drugs, buildings) is very crucial for the well-being of the consumers 
of the goods and also for the public at large. Safety assurance (i.e., safety regula­
tions) is thus a publicly provided service. The same is true for honest trading, report­
ing (of product quality), and advertising.
Toll goods do not create the problem of private provision. Although they are 
jointly consumed, it is possible to exclude those consumers who do not pay the price 
charged for their use. Consequently, goods of this nature are readily supplied in the 
market place. However, some toll goods exhibit economies of scale in production 
or decreasing unit cost. A nd decreasing cost creates the problem of optimal pric­
ing, and, hence, the optimal quantity to be supplied. It also leads to the formation 
of a monopoly or reinforces the monopolistic position of a natural monopoly. These 
are the aspects of toll goods that create problems of provision. In certain countries 
these toll goods are supplied by government, usually via public enterprises; in other 
countries they are supplied by private monopolies and closely regulated by govern­
ment; and in many other countries they are supplied by private entrepreneurs with 
minimal control who may also face competition from existing (or potential) private 
enterprises.
Evidence seems to suggest that private enterprises are likely to be more effi­
cient than public enterprises, especially when the former face direct or indirect com­
petition. The principal reason for this is that public managers have no incentive to 
maximize the return to the organization since the return does not accrue to them. 
W hen the organization suffers losses, the wealth of public managers is, correspond­
ingly, not reduced. Private entrepreneurs cannot tolerate inefficiency without jeo p ­
ardizing their wealth position. To avoid loss and to maximize profits, private 
entrepreneurs must try their best to be the most efficient. The greater the degree 
of competition, the m ore efficient they have to be in order to make any profit at all.
Common-pool goods create another type of problem. Such goods can be 
privately produced and individually consumed. To this extent their provision does 
not create any problem  to producers; it does, however, create problem s with the 
availability of supply. The supply source of common-pool goods is nature (e.g., gas, 
crude oil, fish). This natural supply can be in danger of depletion as private 
producers collectively exhaust the common supply and no one producer is able to 
exclude others from exhausting the supply. Supply depletion is a societal problem 
and can be viewed as a negative public good (or “public bad”). The control of supp­
ly utilization to prevent depletion becomes a task perform ed by government (i.e., 
provider of supply regulation or restrictions on use). Similarly, assuring that the 
supply is available is also a task undertaken by government (i.e., research and ex­
pansion of the supply).
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T H E  D IR E C T I O N  O F  P R IV A T IZ A T IO N
Given the discussion of the four major types of goods wc are now in the posi­
tion to summarize a general direction for privatization.
If the good/service in question is a private good/service, then the good/service 
should be provided by the private sector. Aspects of private goods/services that can 
definitely be treated  as exhibiting a collective-good clement should be provided by 
the public sector. Moreover, the existence of a monopoly and/or the decreasing unit 
cost of private provision can also call for public intervention. This is also true when 
externality exists in private good/service production or in consumption.
If the service in question is classified as a toll good, then the service should be 
provided by private entrepreneurs with appropriate supervision from government. 
G overnm ent regulation should be minimum to the extent that monopolistic power 
is not exploited to the disadvantage of consumers and that direct and indirect com ­
petition among producers of substitutes can be prom oted and sustained.
If the service in question is identified as a common-pool good, then the service 
should also be provided by the private sector. Public provision in such a case should 
be confined to activities which will ensure supply expansion and avoid depletion.
If the service in question is regarded as a collective good, then the service should 
be provided by government when private collective action to provide it cannot be 
mobilized. To the extent that inputs for the production of a collective good are them ­
selves private goods, their production should be left to the private sector. Table 2 
summarizes the preceding discussion.
Th e decision to provide versus the decision to produce
The preceding discussion focuses mainly on what should (or should not) be 
publicly provided, although the writer also alludes to the production aspect of 
provision. In the context of privatization a distinction should now be m ade between 
privatization of provision and privatization of production. A  decision faced by any 
government in this situation m aybe stated as follows. “The prim ary policy decision 
of government is to provide a service and the secondary decision is to  produce a ser­
vice” (Kolderie 1986). Looking at the issue in this manner, four possible kinds of 
decisions emerge.
1. Governm ent decides to do neither. Hence, both the provision and produc­
tion of a service take place in the private sector. Such a decision mostly in­
volves private goods as discussed above.
2. Governm ent decides to do both. H ence, both provision and production of 
a service take place in the public sector. Such a decision mostly involves 
collective goods as discussed above.
3. Governm ent decides to provide a service but not to produce it. The ser­
vice is thus publicly provided and privately produced (e.g., a national high­
way); it involves some forms of contracting out. Positively, whether such a 
case is actually confined to a collective good is a political decision. Nor- 
matively, it should be related to collective goods.
4. A  private ind ividu al decides to provide a service but not to produce it. In­
stead, the individual turns to government for its production. The service is 
thus privately provided but publicly produced. Such cases may be very few, 
but they do exist in Thailand (for example, the hiring of police officers by 
jewelery shops or commercial banks to provide security protection).
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Table 2 D esired Pattern  of Provision
G o o d s Provision private
provision
public
provision
(1) private goods
product proper
element of 
publicness
X
X
( 2 )  toll goods
product proper
element of 
publicness
X
X
(3) common-pool 
goods
product proper
element of 
publicness
X
X
(4) collective 
goods
product proper X
17Controversy arises more often in type (3) than in type (2) decisions. In both 
cases controversy arises when the nature of the service is problematic. In other 
words, public provision is questioned when the service is either a toll good or a com ­
mon-pool good.
D E C IS IO N  C R I T E R I A  F O R  P R IV A T IZ A T IO N
Th e  case of public versus private provision
The distinction made above between the decision of government to provide a 
service and the decision of government to produce a service should help put the issue 
in proper perspective. Public provision may or may not be appropriate. The type of 
service in question is helpful to determ ine its suitability. The final judgm ent on this 
m atter is, of course, a political judgm ent and hence a political decision.
As such, the reasons used to make decisions are seldom agreed upon by all 
decision makers involved. Indeed, decisions derived from a political process are ex­
pected to be controversial.
Nevertheless, economic analysis can still offer insight to initial decisions about 
provision. Thus, in deciding to provide a public service the issue usually involves 
the type of service to be provided. As already discussed, there are a number of ser­
vices that cannot be decisively determ ined on efficiency grounds alone. For some 
services a high degree of external economy may be the principal reason for public
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provision, although the goods are not pure-public goods. For still others, prevent­
ing the formation of a private monopoly may be the dominant reason for public 
provision.
Moreover, the availability of a particular good/service is considered desirable 
because the service is beneficial to those who consume it, yet no private producer is 
willing to provide it. This reason is implicit in the majority of collective goods 
provided publicly. O f course, in cases in which private collective action comes forth 
to ensure the availability of certain public goods (which does often happen), public 
provision is not called for. Also in many cases, the availability of a service (e.g., slum 
clearance, housing for the poor) benefits a specific group needing special assistance, 
which, if left to market mechanisms, would not be made available. U nder these cir­
cumstances, public provision is regarded as the appropriate means to guarantee the 
availability of the good/service. H ere the purpose of public provision is equity or 
welfare and the degree of concern for the distributive effect or the aspects of equi­
ty can be viewed as politically determ ined. Thus, in many countries, especially those 
with highly skewed income distribution patterns, the equity consideration may be 
the predom inant criterion.
In other cases, another set of reasons may prom pt decisions to provide certain 
services through the public sector. These reasons are national security and reasons 
associated with national security (such as preventing private producers from having 
excessive economic power or political influence). Justifications for the public 
provision of such services as the national rail service, international airports, nation­
al trading ports, and electric utilities are invariably related to national security. Fur­
ther, this line of reasoning is also related to political value judgments.
On the basis of the preceding analysis it is obviously impossible to determ ine 
the optimal mix between privately- and publicly-provided goods and services in any 
economy. Indeed, the actual mix is the result less of economic reasoning than of 
political decisions. In an economy where politicians and the government are more 
conscious of the welfare of the poor and the underprivileged or are believers in the 
welfare system, the proportion of publicly-provided goods and services (m easured 
in terms of G D P) is likely to be greater than would otherwise be the case. Even in 
such an economy two additional factors —which have lately assumed much relevance 
in most countries — must still be considered: (1) the size of government may have al­
ready become “too big” to be comfortable for many citizens; and (2) the difficulty 
of the government’s raising more taxes while obviously being unable to provide m ore 
public services because of financial constraints.
T o  privatize  or not. In the context of this discussion the relevant decision in­
volving privatization is whether or not certain now publicly-provided goods and ser­
vices should be turned over to the private sector. The decision criteria not to privatize 
compose (in descending order of im portance): (1) national security; (2) equity; (3) 
private willingness; and (4) efficiency. Stated differently, a decision to privatize 
should be m ade on the basis of the four criteria just noted.
P u b lic  versus private production
For whatever reasons a public-provision decision has been made, there still 
remains the choice between public and private production. The choice of public 
production over private production or vice versa can be m ade on the basis of ef­
ficiency because efficiency can be easily dem onstrated and the choice readily 
evaluated.
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Thus production decisions can be made more easily if the service in question is 
divided into component subservices. Some services (such as police protection, or 
education, or health care) may be too broad to determ ine an efficient mode of 
production. If, however, police services were disaggregated (into police public rela­
tions, police training, traffic control, parking enforcement, towing away illegally 
parked cars, preventive patrol, homicide investigations), different methods of 
production (whether public or private) could be appraised and the most efficient 
one selected. Not all of these subservices require gun-carrying police officers who 
are on the public payroll; some of these services could easily be in the hands of 
private enterprise.
Relevant to this discussion is another aspect of service, which is, in one respect, 
very closely related to service disaggregation. Any service production involves a 
m ultitude of inputs. Some of these inputs can be distinguished as interm ediate 
products. For example, the production of the agricultural extension service may in­
volve seeds, fertilizer, technical handbooks. Some of these services may be classified 
as support services, for example, office building cleaning, vehicle repair and main­
tenance, elevator service, personnel training. All of these services need not be 
publicly produced (i.e., by people who are on the public payroll); m ore often than 
not, they can be produced privately.
O utput specificity is another aspect of service which figures in decisions about 
production methods. The output of some services can be specified precisely. In­
deed, refuse collection, highway construction, street paving, for example, can easi­
ly be contracted out to a producer and the production cost calculated with little 
ambiguity or misunderstanding. The efficiency of service delivery can be appraised. 
Alternative methods of production are thus effectively available. Such may not be 
the case for many other services such as police protection or education. The ser­
vice output here cannot easily be specified, for only with great difficulty can such a 
service be quantitatively and qualitatively defined. In cases like these, close super­
vision and monitoring arc needed to judge the fulfillment of delivery specifications.18 
For very demanding providers of the service, in-house production may be a m ore 
efficient way of producing it, as providers presumably know best what they really 
want. Public provision in such a case may also involve public production.
Availability of producers should also be considered when a decision on produc­
tion method is contemplated. If no private producer is available, the government 
obviously has to undertake the production of the service it is to provide. When 
private producers are available in large numbers, the choice of production method 
is then wider and the most efficient mode can be selected.
The three m ain crite ria
The choice of public production or private production should be made on the 
basis of the efficiency criterion as well as other criteria such as equity and com peti­
tion. Everything else being equal, if private production would help improve the wel­
fare of recipients much more than public production, private production should be 
chosen. Competition should also be another criterion; if private production of a 
publicly-provided service promotes competition in the market, while public produc­
tion does not and other aspects are the same, then the choice of private production 
is indicated.
W hen the application of these criteria produces conflicts, tradeoffs must be 
made depending on the subjective value placed on each criterion. In this discussion
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the efficiency criterion ranks ahead of the equity criterion, which, in turn, ranks 
ahead of the competition criterion.
Relevant form s of privatization
Privatization of production involves many forms. Which of the measures chosen 
may again be based on the three criteria above. A t this decision level, a fourth 
criterion, individual freedom, should also be added. O ther aspects being equal, the 
form of privatization which increases individual freedom of choice must take 
precedence over other forms. Normally, tradeoffs of criteria are a part of the 
decision-making process. H ere the preceding ranking of criteria is also applicable, 
with the individual freedom criterion ranking last. O f course, alternative ranking 
systems are also possible, for choice is ultimately a m atter of value judgment.
In short, the following set of criteria is proposed for making decisions about 
privatizing publicly-provided goods and services: (1) national security; (2) equity; 
(3) private willingness; and (4) efficiency. The relevant criteria for decisions on 
public versus private production are: (1) efficiency, (2) equity; and (3) competition. 
The proposed criteria for the choice of the form (or m easure) of privatization are 
as follows: (1) efficiency; (2) equity; (3) competition; and (4) individual freedom.
Chapter Three
Implementing a Privatization 
Program in Thailand
T h e  preceding conceptual framework details the elements to  be considered in 
choosing public provision over private provision or vice versa. O nce public 
provision is chosen as the method, the framework also suggests criteria for choos­
ing public versus private production — or both of these choices can be posed as 
privatization of provision and privatization of production. Given the desire to 
privatize, a privatization measure or a form of privatization must also be chosen for 
each specific case. The criteria for such a choice arc also discussed in the preced­
ing section. We now propose to discuss the implementation of a privatization 
program in Thailand in the light of this framework; however, before the nature of 
implementation in Thailand is discussed, we must define the privatization program 
we have in mind.
A privatization program in this discussion signifies an effective set of specific 
activities consciously undertaken by the government whose objectives are to effi­
ciently increase competition among producers of goods/services; to enhance ef­
ficacy of price mechanisms; and to enlarge private involvement in the provision and 
production of goods/services.
Faced with tax revenue constraints and its already over-extended resources 
(resource from foreign borrowings), Thailand has no choice but to systematically 
launch a privatization program which must be begun now and be carried out into 
the future. The relevant question is how to design a program of privatization that 
will ensure achieving the privatization objectives stated above. An effective 
privatization program for Thailand should have two principal components:
1. Strategies to be pursued as guidelines for specific privatization actions; and
2. Specific activities to be privatized and approaches to be used in specific 
cases.
Each of these two components will be discussed in turn.
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S T R A T E G I E S  F O R  P R IV A T IZ A T IO N
In planning an effective privatization program  one should not plunge directly 
into the identification of one or several activities to be privatized. Such an approach 
is likely to cause confusion and, more often than not, resistance —which is already 
apparent in Thailand. Instead, it is proposed that the following five strategics be 
adopted as broad guidelines for identifying specific cases for privatization and for 
working out the details involved in privatizing those activities.
Strategy 1: M in im um  intervention and im proved com petition
The strategy of minimum intervention and improved competition frees the 
market to operate without unnecessary regulations and restrictions. By fostering 
m arket forces, competition would improve, which would not otherwise be the case. 
Deregulation and liberalization would be the principal measures put to use under 
this strategy.
Strategy 2: M in im um  pub lic production
Minimum public production reduces the amount of public production and the 
delivery of publicly-provided services. This strategy involves such m easures as con­
tracting out, farming out, leasing, turn-key operations, franchising, and voucher- 
and-grant.
Strategy 3: Lo a d sh e d d in g
L oad shedding trim s nonbasic or unnecessary public services presently  
provided by the government and can be related both to type of service offered and 
to the quantity of particular public services. This strategy suggests that public 
provision should be confined to collective goods that are not being collectively 
provided by the private sector and to public aspects of toll goods, common-pool 
goods, and private goods.
Strategy 4: U tilizatio n  o f the com m ercial princip le
Utilization of the commercial principle means charging for public services 
whenever possible. This strategy thus involves extending the application of user 
charges (tariffs, tolls, fees) in the public sector.
Strategy 5: T ra n sfe r of ownership
Transfer of ownership reduces and eliminates proprietorships and the opera­
tion of state-owned enterprises. This strategy includes measures such as divestitures 
of varying degrees.
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The order of the strategies as presented above represents implicit priorities. 
Priority rankings are based on case of implementation, both in respect to the time 
it takes to devise detailed steps to implement the measure and determining the na­
ture of enforcement. It also reflects the degree of public acceptability. As is already 
evident above, each strategy involves respective forms of privatization. These 
strategies thus suggest actions to be undertaken and specific areas in which these 
actions would benefit the public sector and the economy as a whole.
S P E C I F I C  A C T I V I T I E S  T O  B E  P R IV A T IZ E D
To link specific cases with proposed strategies the cases are categorized under 
each strategy below. It should be borne in mind that these cases were chosen on the 
basis of the criteria detailed on the preceding pages. Briefly, in respect to decisions 
on public provision, the criteria consist mainly of national security, equity, private 
willingness, and efficiency. With respect to choice of private production over public 
production, the criteria are efficiency, equity, and competition. A nd regarding 
forms of privatization, the criteria include efficiency, equity, competition, and in­
dividual freedom. The cases must consequently be judged in that light.
U nder Strategy 1, m inim um  intervention and improved competition, the follow­
ing cases are suggested:
• A bolition  of p rice  con tro ls over services provided by sta te-ow ned 
enterprises which remain in the public domain;
« Abolition of detailed control and interference with the management of state- 
owned enterprises and adoption of control procedures which stress perfor­
mance auditing;
> Abolition of price controls over consumer goods/services;
.  Abolition of price guarantees for agricultural produce;
• Abolition of control mechanisms imposed on agricultural and m anufactured 
goods exports;
• Abolition of controls over type and quantity of crops to be grown and areas 
to be planted;
• Abolition of laws controlling the growth of enterprises and new estab­
lishments to prom ote competition;
• Improvement of mechanisms for standard quality control over the produc­
tion of private goods, toll goods, and common-pool goods;
• Abolition of rules, regulations, and other kinds of red tape which hinder the 
acquisition of public services;
• Installation of better mechanisms to facilitate dealings with the government.
U nder strategy 2, m inim um  public production, the following cases are offered:
• C ontracting out all possible cases whose production activities have a 
specified output. Public services should be disaggregated in order to 
facilitate the identification of these outputs. Examples are street cleaning, 
building cleaning, garden keeping, research projects;
> Contracting out the management of (1) a public enterprise while awaiting 
transfer of ownership and (2) an inefficient public enterprise whose service 
is regarded as essential;
24 Implementing a Privatization Program in Thailand
• Franchising certain privileges presently in the public domain. Examples arc 
concessionaries in publicly-owned space (public parks), the operation of 
certain railways, intra- and intcr-citybus transport, and inter-provincial air 
lanes.
• Farming out certain activities presently undertaken by the government such 
as the levying of traffic fines and the collection of parking fees;
• U se of the turn-key approach for the construction of certain infrastructural 
facilities. Examples are provincial ports and bus/truck depots or terminals.
U nder strategy 3, load shedding, we submit the following cases:
• Cancellation of public refuse collection;19
• Insistence on private provision of collective goods when beneficiaries of col­
lective goods can readily be identified and arc able to be organized. An ex­
ample of this case is the provision of basic infrastructural facilities for 
housing projects;
• Encouraging the private provision of toll goods that are considered good for 
the health of the citizens such as amusement parks and public gardens;
■ Answering the need for the rapid expansion of universities, colleges, and 
hospitals by promoting the establishment of more private institutes. This 
will help ease the pressure placed on the government which it finds increas­
ingly difficult to satisfy.
> G reater participation of nongovernment organizations and private firms in 
rural development programs;
• W ithdrawal from the public provision and production of housing for mid­
dle- and upper-middle-income groups and pushing more for the private 
provision of housing for m edium - and greater-than-m cdium  income 
earners. This suggestion implies the withdrawal of certain functions 
presently  perform ed by the N ational H ousing A uthority  so that the 
Authority can fully concentrate on the provision of housing for the poor with 
appropriate financial assistance from the government. The provision of 
housing for the poor is thus regarded as a publicly-provided service.
« Withdrawal from the public provision and production of goods/services 
which are presently also marketed (or potentially m arketable) by private un­
dertakings (such as canned products, hotel services, glassware, and tan­
neries). These cases are further noted in connection with the cases under 
strategy 5.
U nder strategy 4, utilization o f  the commercial principle, the following cases are 
suggested:
• I mposition of a service charge in cases such as flood control, street use (when 
a street is converted into an expressway or a new expressway is constructed), 
lane improvement;
• Increasing the price imposed on services which have had or should have had 
user charges such as bus fares and certain services presently offered by 
public bureaus whose beneficiaries are able to be identified. O f course, in 
some of these cases equity must be considered; in some of these cases a price 
increase may have to be m oderate or other measures should accompany the 
increase in service price to alleviate the burden on the poor.
Implementing a Privatization Program in Thailand 25
U nder strategy 5, transfer o f  ownership, we offer the following suggestions:
* Transfer of ownership of all state-owned enterprises —regardless of their 
profit and loss standing —which produce for sale goods/services that are 
presently also m arketed or potentially marketable by private undertakings. 
Examples of these state-owned enterprises are the Syndicate of Thai Hotels 
and Tourists Enterprises Ltd., the Cholburi Sugar Corporation Ltd., North 
E ast Jute Mill Co. Ltd., the Playing Cards Factory, the Dhipaya Insurance 
Co. Ltd., the Thai M arble Corporation Ltd., the Thai Plywood Co. Ltd., the 
Government Cold Storage Organization, the Telephone Organization of 
Thailand, the Glass Organization, the Textile Organization, the Battery O r­
ganization. This suggestion also extends to subsidiaries of these public 
enterprises and of other state-owned enterprises as long as these sub­
sidiaries produce for sale goods/services which can be produced by the 
private sector.
• Transfer of ownership of these public enterprises should be carried out on 
a case-by-case basis. Complete transfer of ownership is proposed for 
reasons to be noted in the next chapter. Forms of transfer should also be 
worked out with respect to the type and size of the state-owned enterprise 
in question as well as the objectives for which it is being privatized.
A  privatization program  does not merely involve the identification of a specific 
area or a particular activity to be privatized. In fact, the more difficult aspects of 
the program  are (1) determining the details and the exact steps to be undertaken in 
order to privatize (say, transfer of ownership) a particular entity or an asset and (2) 
formulating a set of rules and procedures to be observed in order to, for example, 
contract out or franchise a specific activity.
Steps to be taken
The preceding discussion of the five strategies has already hinted at the broad 
steps to be taken.
1. T h e  first step involves examining the laws and regulations imposed by the 
government which obstruct free trade and hinder market competition. This 
step will lead to the identification of areas and specific cases for liberaliza­
tion and deregulation.
2. T h e  second step is a review of the production of collective or public goods 
presently found in the public sector. Such a review will suggest possibilities 
for contracting out to private producers and other similar measures.
3. T h e  th ird  step involves an analysis of the present structure of services in 
the public sector to discover whether there are any private goods, common- 
pool goods, or toll goods provided by the government. This step helps iden­
tify possibilities of load or burden reduction.
4. To the extent that certain common-pool goods or toll goods should still be 
in the public domain for whatever reason, the fourth step involves an 
analysis of the possibilities for imposing user charges on these services.
5. Th e  fifth step is a review of public enterprises and publicly-owned assets 
to shed light on the possibilities of liquidation and divestiture.
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Although this discussion tries to be quite specific about the areas of privatiza­
tion within the five-strategy framework, it is still not sufficiently specific in identify­
ing the steps to be followed in the privatization process for each specific case. This 
is to be expected because of the nature of this study and the richness of activities in 
the public sector. The detailed nature of each public activity must be examined care­
fully in order to  determ ine the steps to be pursued for successful privatization. To 
accomplish this task, an institution —to be called the National C enter for Privatiza­
tio n —is proposed. It would be set up to (1) identify the specific government and 
public-enterprise activities to be privatized and (2) determ ine the appropriate steps 
to be followed in launching the privatization process in particular cases. The Center 
would also be in charge of formulating standard procedures for implementing 
privatization activities. O f course, in keeping with the spirit of privatization, specific 
in-depth studies would be contracted out to outside consultants.
Privatization should not be viewed as a current fad to be looked into and then 
forgotten. It should be seen as a general approach to reducing the size of the public 
sector and to increasing efficiency in the public and the private sectors. Indeed, the 
potential privatization of public activities should always be explored and imple­
m ented if the possibility exists. There is thus a need for an institution such as the 
National Center for Privatization.20
T H E  P O L I T I C A L  E C O N O M Y  O F  P R IV A T IZ A T IO N
Before discussing the potential problems involved in implementing a privatiza­
tion program, it is appropriate, at this point, to discuss some aspects of the political 
economy of privatization.
The political economy of privatization involves the nature of the distributive 
patterns of positive and negative effects generated by the very act of privatization. 
Positive effects refer to benefits to be obtained and negative effects refer to losses 
to be shouldered by the country and by certain groups of people. These effects may 
be immediate (in the sense that they are generated as soon as the privatization 
m easure for a particular case is enforced) or they may be rem ote (in that there will 
be some lag time before the expected effects become realities). Because effects are 
distributed differently on different groups of people — intended or unintended — 
each group reacts differently—either favorably or unfavorably—generating a politi­
cal reaction that affects ultimate decisions which are economic in nature.
Relevant interest groups to  be considered in the im plementation of a privatiza­
tion program  include the following: owners, managers, employees, customers, tax­
p a y e rs , p o te n t ia l  in v e s to r s /c o n t r a c to r s / f r a n c h is e e s / le a s e e s ,  a n d  th e  
financial/business community. The following discussion attem pts to describe the 
nature of some expected effects, of the differential impact on different interest 
groups, and their probable reactions. Toward this end the discussion is organized 
in term s of the five strategies described earlier.
Effects of strategy one
Pursuing strategy one —minimum intervention and im proved com petition 
(which can be im plem ented through liberalization and deregulation) — will generate 
the following effects. Income for deregulated/liberalized industry will increase; 
those involved in this industry should be better off than before. However, formerly
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protected or regulated firms will have their income reduced insofar as they will now 
obtain economic rent from their privileged position. Those involved in these firms 
would be worse off than before. Improved competition generated from deregula­
tion or liberalization will make firms m ore responsive to consumers; hence con­
sumers will get better service and improved product quality.
M ore specifically, owners of those firms which com pete successfully in the new 
business environment would increase their income. W hen the situation involves a 
public enterprise, the relevant interest group here would be those at the managerial 
level of the enterprise. D epending on the exact nature of deregulation/liberaliza­
tion, management would gain from operating in a more liberal environment, easing 
the decision-making process and enhancing business autonomy. To the extent that 
deregulation causes the public enterprise to be in the vulnerable position of facing 
competition — in which it never was before —management stands to experience 
lower income if it is unable to adjust operations to compete successfully. In such a 
situation the management of this enterprise would resist privatization and it should 
be given extra inducements to help ensure successful post-deregulation/liberaliza- 
tion operations.
Employees of liberated/deregulated firms would profit by their firms’ com pet­
ing successfully and expanding production. However, employees of a formerly mo­
nopolized public enterprise may face reduced income if the public enterprise is 
unable to compete with new entrants.
As already noted, the situation prevailing after deregulation/liberalization 
would benefit consumers of the service as well as new firms which would be able to 
enter the liberated field. The investment climate would improve because of the 
government’s hands-off policy, thus benefiting the business community as a whole.
In conclusion, the pursuit of the minimum intervention and improved com peti­
tion strategy via liberalization/deregulation would benefit more groups than it would 
hurt. From  this perspective this approach (coming from formerly protected  firms) 
should encounter little or no resistance. Firms should be offered compensation in 
one form or another to reduce resistance if the resistance is of a magnitude to hinder 
the strategy’s implementation.
Effects of strategy two
The pursuit of strategy two, minimum public production, can be carried out by 
way of contracting out, farming out, leasing, franchising, or voucher-and-grant. This 
strategy would increase the income of firms which provide substitutes for govern­
ment production of the good/service in question. This situation will encourage the 
expansion of firms receiving franchises, contracts, and leases and thus improve the 
investment climate of the business community as well as extend the benefits to 
enterprise employees. Consumers of the affected service can expect to receive bet­
ter service (both in quality and in quantity) and they may also be offered more 
product choices. Further, to the extent that private firms are able to perform  the ser­
vice at a lower cost than the government, the service may also be offered at a reduced 
price. Thus, the general tax-paying public will receive more public services at the 
same tax level because cost savings from this form of privatization will be rechan­
neled to provide other services. Indeed, they may even pay lower taxes if cost savings 
lead to tax reductions.
To the extent that government agencies or public enterprises are released from 
the production of certain goods and services, their ability to perform their rem ain­
ing tasks may improve as they would then be able to concentrate on managing fewer
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tasks and this improved efficiency will benefit customers receiving their services. In 
the case of franchising, leasing, and farming out the government agencies and public 
enterprises concerned would also make a higher net income than they would o ther­
wise; however, the negative effects could involve employees being laid off because 
their services were no longer needed, although it is m ore likely that these employees 
would be redeployed in other areas where dem and had increased.
In sum, the pursuit of the second strategy suggested in this report will yield net 
beneficial effects to various interest groups and to the economy as a whole — 
provided that the service or product that is being privatized under this strategy has 
been well selected and implemented. A nd the chance for resistance against this 
privatization strategy is very low when the nature of the privatization process has 
been clearly articulated beforehand.
Effects of strategy three
Load shedding, which is the third strategy delineated here, can be pursued 
through government withdrawal from the provision of certain services. The decision 
directly affects the general public who receive the service in question. They either 
have to go without the service or turn to private producers for the service for which 
they will now have to pay. In either case they suffer a loss of welfare and those who 
are poor may not be able to secure the same amount of sen jee  they formerly 
received. Employees of a given government agency or public enterprise may be­
come unemployed as their services would be no longer be needed. This certainly 
would reduce the income of these employees who may not be happy even with 
reasonable severance pay. Obviously, they would not favor a load-shedding strategy. 
O f course, for those who are employed by government agencies, the likelihood that 
they would be redeployed is high as they can be used to increase production of other 
needed services. To the extent that redeployment is carried out, they would not be 
laid off. However, employees of a public enterprise which is liquidated (as its ser­
vice is withdrawn from the general public) may face actual lay-offs. A nd this is cer­
tainly the group which needs to be placated.
Against these negative effects are the positive effects generated by load shed­
ding. To begin with, potential investors are given an opportunity to provide a ser­
vice that is abandoned by a government agency or a public enterprise. This opens 
up the investment horizons of private enterpreneurs and improves the investment 
climate of the economy. The government will be able to reduce the scope of its ac­
tivities with load shedding, thus releasing resources for use in other, more valued 
activities. O r if the government decides not to make use of resources so released, it 
can reduce the taxes collected from its citizens. Thus the welfare of the general 
public will increase in either case. If a public enterprise, which was operating at a 
loss and was being subsidized by the government, is abandoned, the general public 
will receive an increase in welfare as the subsidy is no longer needed for the public 
provision of the service in question.
In short, the strategy of load shedding will generate both positive and negative 
effects. D epending on the nature of the abandoned service, the equity issue related 
to consumers who are relatively poor should not be overlooked. However, it is like­
ly that the choice of service to be withdrawn will itself reduce the extent of the ineq­
uity, as the service abandoned would not likely be one heavily consumed by the poor. 
Employees who are in fact laid off as a result of load shedding must be financially 
com pensated. On balance, the choice of the load-shedding strategy would yield net
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beneficial effects for the economy and could be implemented with appropriate 
measures to reduce the degree of negative effects on certain groups of individuals.
Effects of strategy four
The strategy of utilizing the commercial principle can be pursued by charging 
for services provided by the public sector. This strategy is applicable to cases where 
public services are provided free of charge and where only a nominal price is 
charged. The former mostly involves services offered by goyernment agencies and 
the latter involves those offered by public enterprises.
Imposition of a service price, also called a charge, toll, or fee immediately af­
fects consumers of the service if the service was formerly provided free of charge or 
at a subsidized price. As in the case of load shedding, consumers who are poor will 
be burdened more heavily than those who are well-off. To the extent that the ser­
vice in question is im portant to the livelihood of the poor, the negative effects should 
be accom panied by measures to relieve or reduce the burden imposed on them.
Except for the negative effect just noted, the imposition of user charges would 
lead to better service in various ways. For instance, there would be an increased 
responsiveness to consumer dem and as the enterprise would try to supply the quan­
tity and the quality dem anded by consumers. There would be increased efficiency 
in service delivery, especially when the industry is also liberalized and competition 
is generated. All these instances yield benefits to consumers of the service in ques­
tion. Moreover, the general public will also shoulder a smaller tax bill because the 
government will not have to foot production costs —which are now recovered 
through commercial pricing and the savings passed on to taxpayers. Alternatively, 
the general public will enjoy increased welfare when the government increases its 
other services, quantitatively and qualitatively, with the savings it has secured by im­
posing user charges.
In view of the preceding discussion, the user charge strategy should be viewed 
as attractive and one which would benefit the economy. The strategy must be im­
plem ented in conjunction with measures imposed to alleviate any perceived burden 
on the poor who used to receive the service free of charge or at an extremely low 
price. A nd these latter measures would help reduce the resistance that would have 
registered against this strategy.
Effects of strategy five
The transfer of ownership strategy is the fifth strategy suggested here and can 
be pursued via divestiture. Divestiture in most contexts is associated with the sale 
of a public enterprise, partially or wholly. A nd it is in respect to public enterprises 
that divestiture is discussed here.
Divestment of a public enterprise directly affects personnel. Both managers and 
employees of the enterprise being put up for sale will lose their jobs unless they are 
retained by the new owner(s) of the enterprise. Only selected persons are likely to 
be retained (for instance, some m embers of the management team  and part of the 
labor force working for the enterprise), because of the implied overstaffing of the 
public enterprise at all levels and the inefficiency associated with it. Though reten­
tion guarantees employment, it does not ensure continuity of seniority and fringe 
benefits formerly received. However, those who are retained would expect im­
proved future income as a result of the increased efficiency associated with the new 
private owner(s) and management team. Those who lose their jobs would suffer a
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reduction in income; however, the size of the income loss would depend on their 
ability to secure new employment and the amount of severance pay offered by the 
government. The severity of suffering would determ ine the intensity of their resis­
tance to divestiture. However, the private sector will experience new employment 
because not all members of the former management team and labor force would be 
retained.
The new owner(s) (a single entrepreneur, or a corporation taking over the 
enterprise, or shareholders who purchase equity shares through the capital market) 
will experience capital gains immediately (because of underpricing the enterprise’s 
value) or later (because of improved operational efficiency). Such a situation will 
lead to a b e tte r  investment climate —especially when the business community is as­
sured of the government’s clear stand on divestiture as manifested by the conduct 
of an actual case. The sale of a public enterprise would secure some income for the 
government (as the former owner) and release it from financial pressure imposed 
by its operations, particularly if the enterprise is habitually in financial trouble. To 
the extent that the enterprise actually suffered losses, the sale represents a reduced 
financial drain of the public coffers. The savings can be used to subsidize other, 
m ore worthwhile activities which will increase public welfare or lead to reduced 
taxes. Government supervision of its remaining public enterprises may also improve 
as there are fewer public enterprises to oversee. This may not occur, however, if the 
sale merely turns a public monopoly into a private monopoly. In such a case, the 
government must still supervise the private monopoly’s operation. Consumers of 
the service would expect to experience better-quality service as privately-owned 
enterprises are more responsive to custom ers’ needs. And when the forces of com­
petition are at work, consumers may also experience lower prices. To the extent that 
the good/service was underpriced when provided publicly, consumers will pay a 
higher price when it is provided privately. As already noted, the tax-paying public 
can expect a general increase in welfare because they will receive better services 
from the government in other areas or benefit from reduce taxes.
S U M M A R Y
It is understandable that the sale of a public enterprise would be viewed nega­
tively by its managers and employees as the action directly affects their source of 
livelihood. Although many groups will benefit from divestiture, the resistance from 
these two vested-interest groups can be intense and must be dealt with satisfactori­
ly if divestiture is to be implemented effectively.
The discussion of the political economy of privatization shows that many groups 
are affected both positively and negatively by privatization. The same person may 
be affected positively from one perspective and negatively from another. The net 
result is a redistribution of well-being even though all may be on the receiving end 
in the long run. The aspects of redistribution must therefore be seriously con­
sidered and rem edial measures (where appropriate) taken in order to implement a 
successful privatization program.
From  this perspective it can be concluded that some strategies —and thus cer­
tain forms of privatization—can be more easily implemented than others. As al­
ready noted, the order of strategies (1-5) presented in this report recognizes and 
reflects this very situation. Transfer of ownership or divestiture of a public 
enterprise is the most difficult —if not altogether impossible — strategy to imple­
ment.
Implementing a Privatization Program in Thailand 31
However, in the interest of equity, those interest groups which are negatively 
affected by any privatization measure must be assured of satisfactory compensation. 
This may come in the form of direct payment (severance pay) or as indirect payment 
(redeploym ent or equity participation). Those who would be positively affected 
must be educated about the immediate or future/direct or indirect benefits they 
would receive and this will help mobilize their support of privatization. Both ap­
proaches are complementary. From an economy-wide perspective, the ultimate 
gain from privatization will be, in one way or another, to distribute benefits equitab­
ly while ensuring that the initial burden on certain groups is minimized.
In the light of the varying degrees of difficulty of implementation, emphasis 
should be placed on pursuing strategies and forms of privatization that can be 
launched with relative ease and which have a better chance of success. Implemen­
tation issues arc discussed in more detail in the following section and certain aspects 
discussed here are also reexamined in the broader context of implementation 
problems.
Problem s facing im plem entation
Implementation of a major public program is not an easy task. To implement 
a privatization program, two sets of problems are encountered: the first involves 
problem s related to the launching of the program and the second involves problems 
related to the implementation of specific cases.
Problem s related to the launching of a program
A  lukewarm acceptance of a privatization program on the part of political 
leaders and leading public bureaucrats will not lead to sustained, effective, im­
plem entation efforts. There must exist strong political will to ensure sustained im­
plem entation. With strong government commitment, program details can be 
worked out and the implementation process begun in earnest. Without commitment 
to privatization, the result will be mere talk.
It has been noted that Thailand has undergone many cases of “privatization” — 
especially in respect to the handling of public enterprises (Phisit 1985; Phanas 1985; 
Phipat 1986). However, these incidents do not suggest the presence of political will 
or strong government commitment to a well thought out program of privatization. 
The past experiences were the result more of isolated policy measures than of a fully 
articulated privatization program. Although isolated privatization measures can be 
found in the recently approved Sixth National Development Plan, the existence of 
strong commitment by political leadership to the implementation of a privatization 
program  remains to be seen.
Nevertheless, there are still problems related to the actual implementation of 
specific cases. On the whole, cases related to strategies one, two, and three face 
fewer problems than cases related to strategies four or five. U nder the first three 
strategies, once government commitment has been secured, implementation will be 
a function of the quality of the steps devised and the quality of the public servants 
implementing them. H igh quality implementation procedures can be expected when 
sufficient time is given and skillful analysts are assigned. The steps to be followed 
must, of course, be carefully studied before they are put in place. Also, the quality 
of public bureaucrats implementing the process may be problematic.
A dditional problems faced by cases related to strategy four (utilizing the com­
mercial principle) involve the extent of public acceptance and the probable effect
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on the poor. Charging a price on a formerly free service or increasing the price of 
a service is always unpopular. Public reception can be won by skillful handling, espe­
cially if explanations are given and benefits identified that are directly linked to  the 
service. The effect on the poor must be softened, however. In other words, the ef­
ficiency criterion strongly suggests the desirability of privatization through user 
charges, but equity considerations support differential treatm ent of the poor who 
may also be consumers of the services in question. Thus, depending on the type of 
service in question, a differential pricing scheme for the poor may be advisable. O r 
if there is a uniform user charge, an alternative (in the form of a special allowance, 
for example) could be offered to  the identifiable poor to com pensate for the extra 
cost to them. O r the government could give special coupons to the poor who con­
sume the service to be used in their purchase of the service.
There are several additional problem s faced by cases related to strategy five 
and they are the principal reasons why, in Thailand, the transfer of ownership of 
public enterprises has been more talk than action. The first problem is w hether or 
not there are potential private, local investors who are sufficiently interested in 
buying the whole enterprise (or part of it). If foreign investors are perm itted, the 
availability of potential purchasers may not be a problem. Given their interest, do 
they have the necessary capital for the purchase? O r is the local capital market 
capable of raising the necessary funds? Thus, the availability of capital funds is a 
condition for transfer of ownership.
Private interest will be generated only if investors are confident in the continuity 
of the commitment to privatization. They have to be assured that (1) their rights on 
their acquired properties are protected against any future infringements; and (2) 
that they can exercise their rights in managing the enterprise. This is particularly 
problem atic when there is only a partial transfer of ownership and the government 
retains a minority interest in the enterprise and when a joint venture is set up. 
However, the jo in t public-private venture approach is only relevant when a new busi­
ness opportunity is being considered. How much and in what m anner will the 
government exercise its authority in making management decisions? R elated to this 
is the clarity of government policy on public enterprise operation and the pattern  of 
control. Unless these aspects are spelled out very explicitly, the transfer of public 
enterprise ownership will not succeed.
Indeed, m ore effective approaches to this problem  are (1) to push for a com ­
plete transfer of ownership or to liquidate the enterprise so that the field is open to 
any private enterprise. M oreover, m ethods must also be chosen for securing private 
capital for the transfer. D epending on the objective of the transfer of ownership, 
the availability of investors, and the strength of the capital market, capital can be 
directly secured by the sale of the enterprise (wholly or partially) to a few private 
entrepreneurs. O r it can be secured by floating stock in the capital m arket to which 
as many investors as possible can subscribe. Thus, Thailand’s present political 
stability and future prospects for continued political commitment to transfer agree­
ment conditions must exist in order to attract private interest.
Big public enterprises which have strong trade unions must get trade union ac­
ceptance of the transfer. This is both a political problem and a problem of financial 
and employment security for the affected employees. A ttractive com pensation 
and/or offers of retention must be m ade in order to win trade union approval. O b­
viously, similar m easures must be worked out for those at the management level of 
the public enterprise to be privatized. And, laws must be revised to perm it the trans­
fer of ownership for most of the public enterprises which are candidates for 
privatization.
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In the light of the preceding discussion, one should not be surprised to find that, 
in Thailand, there is more talk about selling public enterprises than there is action. 
In fact, of the five strategies proposed for privatization, transfer of ownership is the 
most difficult to  execute and, hence, is the last strategy listed — althougth it is the ap­
proach most often discussed in Thailand. The problems just described suggest the 
kinds of conditions that must be met for the successful implementation of a privatiza­
tion program. Indeed, identifying these problems helps focus on the aspects of most 
concern. They are not insurmountable. Some solutions are obvious and can be put 
into effect with strong present and future commitment. O thers must be worked out 
in the context of particular cases along with specific privatization objectives.
--------------------------------------------- -
Chapter Four
Recommended Actions 
for the Successful Launching of 
a Privatization Program
1 1 hus, to  pave the the way for the successful launching of a privatization program  
based on the strategies proposed here, certain relevant short-term  and long-term 
actions must first be undertaken by the government.
SHORT-TERM  ACTIONS
The first action that must take place is the very clear articulation of the privatiza­
tion policy to be pursued by the government. The government must be precise about 
how it stands on the privatization issue, whether or not it is interested in privatiza­
tion, what is to be privatized and what is not, and how and when privatization is to 
be effected in specific cases. Unless a clear statem ent on this m atter is forthcom ­
ing, very little progress on privatization can be made. Indeed, as is evident in the 
energy sector, hesitation — and even confusion — will reign. Consequently, a clearly 
articulated privatization policy is the first task required of the government as a 
manifestation of strong political will and clear public intention.
The second action is the establishment of some form of national privatization 
center. Such a center will undertake to identify the specific activities in the govern­
ment and the public-enterprise sectors to be privatized, and will outline the ap­
propriate steps to be followed in launching the privatization process for particular 
cases. It will also formulate standard implementation procedures for privatization. 
By systematically carrying out these activities, the Center will provide relevant in­
form ation for proper action. Further, the establishment of such a C enter will 
provide more evidence of political will and dem onstrate the government’s strong in­
tention to carry out its privatization policy.
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L O N G -T E R M  A C T IO N S
The following actions should also be initiated as soon as possible after the 
recommendations above are effected. These actions, by their very nature, will take 
a much longer time to yield results and arc treated as long-term actions.
The government should undertake the codification and clarification of laws re­
lated to privatc-property rights which are the foundation for the viability of the 
private market system. This would also include the introduction of new laws to 
prom ote and protect private property rights (for instance, the enactm ent of laws re­
lated specifically to the ownership of assets — in whatever form — that had formerly 
belonged to the public sector). These laws would protect the new owner from any 
whimsical public action on these properties. New laws must be formulated to specify 
appropriate government controls and interventions on the operation of public 
enterprises which have private individuals as major shareholders. These laws will 
assure individuals that their property rights will not be easily violated. Sustained ac­
tion on these m atters will provide added evidence of political will and the 
government’s firm determ ination to pursue its privatization policy.
In addition to the codification and clarification of laws and as a basis for de ter­
mining privatization possibilities, serious research and study should be undertaken 
by the government to review the existing services it provides. Such a task is in­
evitable, because determining what services should be involved in a privatization 
program is a difficult task. Unless detailed analyses are undertaken for individual, 
specific cases, not much will be accomplished. Not only must specific government 
and public-enterprise cases for privatization be identified, but appropriate steps to 
be pursued for the privatization of a particular case must also be investigated in 
depth. In short, there remains a great deal of work to be done in the area of privatiza­
tion. If the government is as serious as it should be about launching an effective 
program of privatization, it must make sure that these studies arc undertaken by the 
new agency proposed earlier, the National C enter for Privatization.
Footnotes
M easures cited here do not represent all the measures discussed in the litera­
ture on privatization. Some of the measures excluded are discussed in the text 
at appropriate places. Some of the measures are treated as variations or sub­
sets of the categories noted in this report. An attem pt is made here to sys­
tematize measures that are identified as privatization by some writers but not 
by others so as to reduce confusion and contradiction among innocent but in­
terested readers.
W hen reference is made to either goods or services or both, the words 
goods/services, goods, and services, more often with the relevant prefix, are 
used interchangeably.
In the case of the U nited Kingdom, state-owned enterprises are in fact form er­
ly private enterprises which were nationalized by the government. It is for this 
reason that divestment is usually discussed under the heading of denationaliza­
tion. In this report the term  divestiture or divestment is p referred  to 
denationalization.
For an illuminating discussion of divestment variations based on the U.K. ex­
perience, see Heald 1985.
O f course in those days of bad communication and transportation, the cruel 
tax farming monopolies might inflict on taxpayers tended to be overlooked and 
slighted and was not reported  to the kings. In the modern-day context, condi­
tions can easily be stipulated and effectively enforced.
W hen the funding is complete, it becomes a case of contracting out.
Indeed, deregulation in the case of the U.S. is the forerunner of the present in­
terest in privatization. However, deregulation was systematically implemented 
as early as 1969, much before the formal launching of the privatization program 
by President Reagan or Prime M inister Thatcher of the U.K. (Okun 1986).
It has been noted that in the U.S. “the safety perform ance of deregulated in­
dustries has been impressive” in spite of fierce competition and lowering the 
price of service. This is accounted for by the strict enforcem ent of safety stand­
ards. (Okun 1986).
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Although no reason is given, H eald (1985) also excludes them from his defini­
tion of privatization. (See footnote 7.)
10 It should be noted that the application of a user charge would lead to cost 
recovery, provided that the charge is based on the full cost of service produc­
tion. But cost recovery as such is not regarded as a privatization measure; it is 
the imposition of a user charge on a service formerly or traditionally provided 
free of charge which is treated as a form of privatization. It is the substantive 
feature of the action which gives rise to the label “privatization”; otherwise, the 
term  is useless for analytical purposes.
11 O f course, the inclusion of these actions noted in the discussion may be 
desirable for the purposes of painting “a bright picture” of a privatization 
program launched by the government.
12 It is mentioned here to reduce confusion among Thai readers as this is a report 
recommending the imposition of taxes as part of its privatization program  
(Samkoscs 1985).
13 We may speculate that the popular usage of “privatization” as being confined 
to the sale or transfer of ownership of public enterprises into private hands 
stems from the fact that the U.K. experience (with the denationalization of na­
tionalized  industries) fits the  T hai setting  of num erous, inept public 
enterprises. H ence the U.K. usage of privatization has been followed, almost 
to the exclusion of other meanings of privatization.
14 It is possible to regard privatization as an end in itself, as in the context of an 
ideology. Then the focus would be to justify why privatization is good, which 
is not the objective of this report.
15 This objective is cited as the aim of Malaysia’s privatization program (Milne 
1986).
16 This is also true in the U nited States (Kolderie 1986).
17 Type (4) decisions will not normally raise problems. Controversy exists to the 
extent that private payment for public service accrues not to the public treasury 
but to public servants (i.e., the case of corruption) and/or that the public ser­
vice in question is in short supply for public purposes — due either to its already 
small supply or to the overextended private use of the available supply.
18 M ore detailed discussion of the implications of this feature of service may be 
found in Savas (1982).
19 This action is different from the suggestion that refuse collection be contracted 
out. The former emphasizes the discontinuation of the public responsibility 
for refuse collection. The service is opened to private entrepreneurs who want 
to cater the collection service to households and businesses. Consumers can 
pick and choose the most agreeable private entrepreneur to handle their 
refuse. They will be ready to change the supplier of the service. In the latter 
case the entire responsibility remains with the government. The contractors 
are hired to produce the service for the government who must see to it that the 
contractors deliver the agreed-upon service. Consumers have no choice in 
supplier, and no alternative except to complain to the government.
20 If a privatization center cannot be established, a viable alternative would be for 
a research institute (such as the Thailand Development Research Institute) to 
vigorously pursue a privatization program.
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